Introduced as a new protocol implemented in "Chrome Canary" for the Google Inc. Chrome browser, "New Hope" is engineered as a postquantum key exchange for the TLS 1.2 protocol. The structure of the exchange is a combination of elliptic curve enhancements along with revised lattice-based cryptography. New Hope incorporates the key-encapsulation mechanism of Peikert which itself is a modified Ring-LWE scheme. The search space used to introduce the closest-vector problem is generated by an intersection of a tesseract and hexadecachoron, or the ℓ ∞ -ball and ℓ 1 -ball respectively. This intersection results in the 24-cell of lattice 4 . With respect to the density of the Voronoi cell , the proposed mitigation against backdoor attacks proposed by the authors of New Hope may not withstand such attempts if enabled by a quantum computer capable of implementing Grover's search algorithm.
Introduction
"New Hope" is a novel encryption scheme based on lattice cryptography and offers post-quantum security within the key exchange. New Hope uses a Montgomery form to reduce cost of implementation in terms of computational speed. As a modification to elliptic curve cryptography New Hope instead reduces cost by sending an xcoordinate to compute the relative x-coordinate of any scalar [1] . Alkim, et al. implement a rounding function ⌊ ⌉ derived from the work of Peikert [2] to achieve equality with the floor function ⌊ + 1/2⌋. This floor function is an element of integers.
New Hope employs = 12289 and = 1024 as constraints of lattice 4 , which results in a reduction of the modulus to = 12289 < 2 14
[1]. Peikert defines both the rounding and floor function of New Hope, using -subgaussian and zeta functions [2] . Peikert's "canonical embedding" necessarily incorporates a homomorphic injective ring that maps ( ) to (ℂ) which fixes pointwise(ℚ) [2] .
The critical nature of an unbiased modular operation presents key values which are assumed to mitigate cryptanalysis. Peikert recommends the use of small noise values to achieve this result while cautioning against cross-rounding given the determinancy that may result [2] . Any such determinancy negates an otherwise unbiased result. It is here that New Hope diverges from its basis on Peikert's work.
The creators of New Hope outline a sketch to create a backdoor in implementations of NTRU lattice-based cryptography. Concerns of a backdoor capability extended to New Hope will now be addressed in detail.
Parameters
The fixed parameter of ( ) may be a potential point of weakness against NTRU [1] . For mildly small values of ( , ) where = , and = 1 mod for some prime, ( ≥ 4 * 16 + 1) there is a point of weakness within the set
Insofar as ( , = + ) it is possible to compute:
such that:
With small enough ( , , , ), computing + ∈ ℤ once ( mod ) is obtained proves the scheme is then corrupted. After establishing = + mod , with the coefficient of ( ) and ( ) smaller than(16), the values of ( , ) have sums within the range (−2 * 16, 2 * 16).
Knowing the values of ( , ) within the range of (−2 * 16, 2 * 16) in terms of: mod ≥ 4 * 16 + 1 is knowing them in ℤ. The manipulation to create a backdoor relies on the pseudo-inverse of a polynomial ( ) as the polynomial ( ∈ ) such that ( * * ≡ mod ) for any polynomial ( ∈ ) such that (1) ≡ 0mod
As long as the secret key equation can be modified to equal ≡ ℎ * + mod it is feasible to apply a pseudo-inversion. For a detailed analysis of inversion oracles refer to the primary source of Mol and Yung [3] . Through implementing the attack developed by Mol and Yung it is possible to show that an attacker possessing both a classical and quantum computer is capable of a backdoor attack against New Hope.
Inversion
Given the new secret key equation derived from [3] , let the following hold:
In both cases, ( , ) are binary. An oracle will output the correct key pair only when ( ∈ ,ℎ ) [3] . To apply this inversion the anti-derivative of the Peikert scheme used by New Hope must be established. According to the authors of New Hope, the implementation of the key encapsulation method (KEM) relies on pseudorandom ring elements exchanged between Alice and Bob which are then used to derive the session key [1] . Alice then employs the ring element ( = ′ + ′ ) and Bob
The authors of New Hope set as parameters of the polynomial ring,
The message sent by Alice is denoted as( ), while Bob's response is( , ) and an element of the ring ( ). The polynomial ( ∈ ℛ ) is public and constant. To generate the function which results in( mod ), the algebraic manipulation itself is fairly straightforward. To begin deriving the necessary function to generate the secret key for an NTRU scheme, a pre-established value equal to mod is introduced:
Via substitution, values of the variables ( , ) already provided are used to calculate values of .
After trivial algebraic manipulations, the values of can be equated to a set of equations, wherein the value of the constant ( ) can be substituted with previously afforded values given in [1] .
= { − + + + mod
Returning to the equations used to calculate , new values of are now substituted and the two previous equations are calculated as equal to one another.
Where ( = −1 mod ) it is then possible to assert ( − + = ), which in turn produces the primary equation for solving the value of mod .
By producing an equation that results in a required value for a backdoor attack against some NTRU lattice-based cryptography, the equation of (( − ) * (
generates the final steps to calculating the secret ( ). Using substitution yet again, but this time of the variable , one derives:
By simplifying the equation, we then produce:
By stating the division in an alternate form, one then has:
= mod
The value of the variable ( ) is itself equivalent to 1 mod 2 . Bearing in mind that = 1024, it is known that ≡ 1 mod 2048. An abbreviated integer table of equivalent values to 1 mod is provided in Table 1.   2049  4097  6145  8193  10241  12289  14337 16385 18433 Table 1 The anti-derivative, or indefinite integral pertinent to this analysis is defined by the variable which is equal to −1 mod , which produces the equation: can be shown to equal ( ≡ ℎ * + (mod )), then an oracle output to break the encryption is feasible. The further constraint of ( ∈ ,ℎ ) is also required. Returning to the values produced by( ), let ( ) be equal to the following
To satisfy the constraint of the variable ( ) as a member of ( ,ℎ ) and with the value of ( ) known, one can substitute for ( ) accordingly. Where ( ) corresponds to the Hamming weights to produce an inversion oracle against NTRU [3] , New Hope employs a weight value of (exp ( − 2 2 2 )) to all integers ( ) such that there is no fixed value for ( ) [1] , but rather each coefficient of ( ) is chosen uniformly at random from ℤ . The discrete Gaussian distribution ( ℤ, ) is parametrized by the Gaussian parameter ( ∈ ℝ) defined by the previously mentioned weight of all ( ). The values of (ℤ ) for an integer ( > 1) must be within the quotient ring (
is the ring of integer polynomials modulo + 1 where each coefficient is reduced modulo ( ).
Algorithmic Geometry
With the intersecting Voronoi 24-cell treated as a convex polytope, the 16-cell ℓ 1 -ball is a simplicial polytope while the ℓ ∞ -ball together with the 16-cell are the only regular Euclidean 4-space tessellations. Given these parameters, the 24-cell constructed as a Voronoi tessellation having center at 4 for any point is expressed as:
If, for any = there is some point where (1) ≡ 0mod , the introduction of an inversion oracle is then verified.
Grover Inversion Parameters
Grover's algorithm was engineered to optimize searches of sub-spaces computed with qubits, for a full detailing of this algorithm see [4] . With respect to generalized searches computed by Grover's algorithm, the coefficients as an evolution of probability amplitudes has an initial probability amplitude: ( Given the risk of executing Grover's algorithm at the expense of performance costs, care must be placed in how many times the computation is performed. The variable of iterations, ( ) is treated in terms of rotations as well as number of correct solutions ( ) [4] . In terms of optimization and performance, it has been shown in [4] that the number of calls of the respective function is (√ 2 ⁄ ). The rotations themselves operate according to the initial amplitude vector, whereby the representation of rotates the subspace amplitude vector through the originating angle twice based on [4] . The iteration continues until the angle of the amplitude representative of the correct subspace is approximately 2 ⁄ where each iteration of is relative to the initial angle:
).
The implementation of Grover's algorithm is treated via reliance on a "needle-in-thehaystack" oracle discussed in [4] . This oracle function, termed is defined within ∈ ℤ, where 0 ≤ ≤ 2 − 1. The further restrictions upon are such that ( ) = 0 for any with the single exception of ( 0 ) = = 1.
By virtue of the work conducted in [5] , for any given which is unknown with respect to the number of solutions, is then treated as any arbitrary integer. Accordingly, is then any arbitrary integer within the range of the uniform distribution of (0, − 1) [5] . As suggested by Boyer, et al. the extension of Grover's algorithm to implement Shor's algorithm as an additional process generates the ability to not only find solution , but also count all solutions . The resulting theorem from the work of Boyer, et al.
is an examination of the number of solutions such that for disjoint subsets, where is the set of solutions and = ⌊ / ⌋ is the number of solutions. The resulting inequality is denoted as
2 . The result of the proof offered by [5] is the number of queries to the oracle to determine if ∈ where is chosen arbitrarily and requires at least iterations for = ⌊sin 8 ⁄ √ − 1⌋.
Grover Implementation using Qubits
With respect to the IBM quantum processor which operates using a 5-qubit configuration, successful programming of Grover's algorithm is achieved using amplitude amplification. For an overview of amplitude amplification refer to [4] . As noted by Pittenger, there is a requirement to embed a bias towards an output of |0⟩ to enable utility from querying the quantum oracle [4] . Within these parameters, and also in accordance with creating a distribution across 5 qubits, the implementation results in a distribution centered about the mean shown in Figure 1 . With the strict need to generate the solution space as a determinant value for a useful output, a vector must cross the originating angle twice [4] . Figure 2 is an output of the program implemented on the IBM quantum processor and results in three such subspaces as parameters for the output of a solution. The circuit itself is produced by the IBMQASM v.1.1 software included as an appendix. The algorithmic implementation for the 5 qubit processor as provided does not use all 5 qubits.
With the given structure of the quantum processor as built and provided by IBM, the 5 th qubit 4 performs no operation. This qubit is left unused as an opening to encode and then test queries to search for potential inversion capabilities against New Hope.
Conclusion
Without direct access to the specific version of Google Chrome which uses New Hope, the complete cryptanalysis using the proposed 5-qubit implementation of Grover's search is incomplete. However, the quantum processor is already capable of conducting modular arithmetic as well as implementations of Grover's algorithm with known numbers of solutions. Given the backdoor threat against NTRU as discussed by [1] , this threat may require further mitigation on behalf of the creators of New Hope. While the Voronoi cell topology offers resilience against classical cryptanalysis, we are not convinced that these same measures prohibit quantum cryptanalysis reliant on both Grover and Shor's algorithms.
The anti-derivative provided opens the possibility to manipulate the secret ( ) while simultaneously using the variable ( ) substituted for ( ) in addition to some constant. This constant added to the variables ( , ) may potentially be based upon the tradition fixed value of NTRU, though applied against New Hope. The vectors of ( ) and relative approximate coordinates may not mitigate against oracle queries isolating these shared values.
